

ASEP; PESA

## Thinking about Education

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### Prologue

“Dasein ‘is’ its past in the way of its own Being, which, to put it roughly, ‘historicizes’ out of its own future on each occasion.” Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (1962 [1927], p. 41). Heidegger correctly claimed that human existence occurs through the complexity of temporality, i.e., through the unification of remembering the past and projecting into the future, thereby realizing one’s own possibilities of being in the world, becoming oneself. My own future is to try to stimulate educational thinking in Australia and New Zealand through writing this requested Academic SELF Portrait for the Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia.

### Learning to Read

Because I am my past, I remember that in eighth grade I wanted to become a pharmacist and therefore planned on studying four years each of English, Mathematics, Science and Latin in high school, even though this would require attendance at summer school one year to include somewhere the required year of United States History. One of my summer school subjects, however, became English 7, in which we read Shakespeare’s *Macbeth*. I subsequently obtained the complete works of Shakespeare in one volume and read parts of it in my homeroom period whenever I had already finished my homework. I

do not remember what I read or what I got out of it, only that I was simply entranced by Shakespeare's wording, just as I was fascinated by Heidegger's wording fifteen years later.

When I became sixteen years old I started working in a drug store as a soda jerk and clerk for twenty hours a week. I had already read the Captain Horatio Hornblower novels and the Leatherstocking tales on my own before meeting Shakespeare. In the fourth year of Latin, we read Virgil's *Aeneid*. It now seems obvious why I joined the U.S. Navy shortly after graduating from high school and why in the Navy's Aviation Photography School I worked very hard to get the best grades to get the first choice of billets. The billets were coming to be on aircraft carriers moored near Seattle, San Francisco, and San Diego, and I definitely did not want to fly over Korea to take pictures. After serving in Jacksonville, Florida, for the rest of my three-year enlistment, plus the Harry Truman year, I enrolled in the civil engineering program at the University of Wisconsin. I easily got better grades than the freshmen who were more interested in earning \$10,000 a year after graduation than studying mathematics, and so I was allowed to take an extra subject the second semester: philosophy. In Freshman English we read Stephen Vincent Benet's *John Brown's Body*, and I wanted to shift to the humanities, but not in Madison. I also wanted badly to write, although I did not know what.

Fortunately, my old high school buddy recommended a small, liberal arts college in Tennessee, where I tried to learn what human existence is all about by studying history, religion, literature, and philosophy, as well as biology. I majored in English Literature, with almost a second major in philosophy. After taking the standard two courses in the history of philosophy as a sophomore, I took courses in American Thought,

political philosophy, ethics, aesthetics, and epistemology, all taught historically, and all except American Thought went from Plato to the present. This gave me an historical perspective on Western Civilization that is not available in analytic or postmodern philosophies. The significance of the historical perspective shows in my papers, “Education, Religion, and a Sustainable Planet,” *Educational Studies* (2008, pp. 58-72), and “Critical Thinking about Truth in Teaching: The Epistemic Ethos,” PESA Conference, 2005, *Educational Philosophy and Theory* (in press).

After college and a postgraduate year in American Studies, a totally unexpected, miraculous event occurred. I was back in Madison enrolled at the graduate level to qualify myself for teaching English in secondary schools when the professor teaching the course on school and society stopped me as I was leaving the room the last day of class. He suggested that I take the courses in philosophy of education and educational classics the next semester. They led to my masters thesis: “Experimentalism in the Anesthetic Society: Existential Education,” published in *Harvard Educational Review* (1962, pp. 155-187), to teaching eleventh grade English for two years, and then to the University of Illinois for the doctorate in philosophy of education.

#### The University of Illinois

Two points should emerge from this brief itinerary. Ever since eighth grade I was deeply interested in my own education at a self-conscious level, wondering how I could find out educationally what human life was all about and how I should live my life. This part of my Academic Self Portrait is directly related to the PESA, for one of the students in my doctoral classes at Illinois was the Australian, Brian Crittenden. During my third

year there I met Ivan Snook, from New Zealand, in the program. I subsequently heard that the Australian, Brian Hill, studied for his doctorate there soon after that, and not much later two more Australians, Bruce and Felicity Haynes, earned their doctorates at the University of Illinois. Why did so many promising scholars from Australia go to the University of Illinois? For the same reason I did. When I asked the supervisor of my master's thesis for the best place to earn a doctorate, I told him I was tired of mediocre professors, and he recommended Illinois, mentioning that Harry Broudy had some background in existential philosophy. For this, see my "Identity Politics, Existentialism, and Harry Broudy's Educational Theory," *Educational Philosophy and Theory* (2001, pp. 365-380).

Whereas Broudy had frequently written as a classical realist, the other professors at Illinois had contrasting viewpoints: William O. Stanley was a Deweyan experimentalist, as was Joe Burnett, whereas B. Othanel Smith used ordinary language analysis, and Foster McMurray was elaborating an autonomous educational theory to avoid the "isms" such as realism, pragmatism, idealism, etc. That is five full-time professors of philosophy of education with contrasting perspectives in one faculty of education, which gained national eminence for the University of Illinois, and international pre-eminence in Australia and New Zealand.

While the doctoral program at Illinois not only expected applicants to have already completed a masters degree in Education, which would have included coursework in Education at the graduate level, it also included a full year of coursework in Education in the doctoral program to get students to the frontiers so their dissertations could be original investigations and also to prepare them to teach philosophy of

education. The Illinois program also required a minor of four subjects in the Philosophy Department and the presence of two members of that department on one's dissertation committee, along with two philosophers of education and one other Education Professor.

Things may have changed in Australia and New Zealand since my retirement because of age-compulsory rules, but the changes in doctoral programs that occurred during my two decades at the University of Queensland were borrowed from the British system and involved individual research for the Bachelors Honors degree and subsequently. I myself thought it would be fraudulent to allow students in Queensland interested in pursuing a doctorate in philosophy of education to enter such a program and encouraged them to go to North America for their doctorates, which they did. It was also relevant that the Philosophy of Education Society in the United States had asked us to severely limit the number of our doctoral students due to shrinking employment opportunities. Was this caveat heeded in Australia and New Zealand?

### Broudy's Influence

Part of my own education in the philosophy of education at Illinois occurred as a graduate assistant to Harry Broudy. As his teaching assistant the first two years, I conducted discussion sessions (tutorials) for the Social Foundations of Education course that Broudy lectured via television. When he visited a session at the students' request, one asked for his personal opinion on the matter at hand. Broudy said it did not matter, for the issue would be around for a long time and it was more important to understand the issue as an issue than to choose either side of it. Deeply impressed, I have almost always taught both sides of the issue at hand and have not thought highly of PESA members who

were blatantly partial for one view or another, left or right, because, according to Socrates, that changes philosophy to propaganda or willful demagoguery.

It was more significant, however, to serve as Broudy's research assistant during my third and last year there, when he began the federally funded "Broudy Project" to locate and establish the legitimate literature of philosophy of education. He asked all PES (US) members to contribute lists of the literature and had half a dozen experts in the field consider the lists and evaluate the items in terms of educational relevance and philosophical competence. He also had three graduate research assistants, including myself. Affecting my entire career were the days I spent in the library looking through educational journals from the year of their origin to the present, searching each issue for articles that met both criteria—about an educational problem and philosophically competent.

Broudy had outlined four problem areas that apparently covered the entire field of education: (1) the nature and aim of education, (2) the organization of instruction and schooling, (3) the selection and organization of the curriculum, and (4) teaching and learning. For a journal article to be considered as a legitimate contribution to the philosophy of education, i.e., to the study of education, it could not simply mention an educational problem in the first and last paragraphs and then merely do something philosophical in between. It had to be about the educational problem throughout, or it was not educational theorizing at all. It was not thinking about education. It also had to be concerned with a specific philosophical dimension of the educational problem, i.e., its ethical, epistemological, or aesthetic aspect, or its political, metaphysical, logical, or linguistic dimension. See *Philosophy of Education: An Organization of Topics and*

*Selected Sources*, edited by Harry S. Broudy, Michael J. Parsons, Ivan A. Snook, and Ronald D. Szoke (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1967).

As a result of my scanning so many educational journals for articles truly about an educational problem and dealing with it in a genuinely philosophical manner, I edited the two volumes of readings for the series concluding the Broudy Project that were not done by the committee of experts: *Teaching and Learning* and *Theory of Knowledge and Problems of Education* (University of Illinois Press, 1969). I also used the basic organization of the Broudy Project to structure all my teaching, research, and writing in the field ever since. It became the paradigm of philosophy of education for me because it included the essential characteristics of education, and therefore of thinking about education. I became more deeply influenced by Broudy than I would have recognized or acknowledged at the time, perhaps as manifested in my paper, "Harry Broudy and Education for a Democratic Society," *Journal of Aesthetic Education* (1992, pp. 5-19).

Equally important as those aspects of my own professional work, however, is that my perception of the writings of others in philosophy of education is also structured by the framework of the Broudy Project. For example, see my recent, "A Guide to Educational Philosophizing After Heidegger," *Educational Philosophy and Theory* (2008, pp. 249-265) in which I gave four previously published articles about Heidegger the critical review to which they were entitled.

I do not think I am the only member of PESA who is competent. Our field, however, is like any other university discipline. Its members function at various levels of competence and some fraudulent things occur from time to time. The point is that as an educational theorist, I taught, researched, and wrote educational theory, i.e., thinking

about education. I did this in various philosophically legitimate ways, even when teaching, with the help of the legitimate literatures of philosophy of education. For example, the aforementioned PESA members who studied at the University of Illinois are legitimate even when they use philosophical methods other than those I use. It is simply that my own background in the study and teaching of literature has enabled me to become sensitive to phenomena in the lived world and therefore able to use phenomenology and ordinary language analysis to articulate the grounding of education in the existence of children and youth, and to be equally concerned about the moral and epistemic dimensions of education and respectful of the genuine attempts of others to think about education ethically, epistemically, and ontologically.

If it is not clear, my response to the four articles on Heidegger and education is similar to my response to many articles in EPAT, which allegedly is the vehicle for PESA members (and others), showing publicly their interests and competencies. What it shows is that some contributors have not had an adequate doctoral program that enabled them to read the cumulative literature that constitutes the field of educational theory treated philosophically, i.e., the field of thinking about education, because they lack a grasp of the historical perspective of their own field.

### Practical Experience

Another aspect is that one can theorize adequately about educating children and youth only if one has taught at the P-12 level, for this experience is necessary to obtain the pre-theoretical understanding of educational problems and phenomena that should be explicated when thinking about education. This need is indicated in the fact that most

advertisements for university appointments in education listed in *The Chronicle of Higher Education* require applicants to have had at least three years of teaching at the P-12 level in addition to the appropriate Ph. D. Practical experience is necessary in any profession. Teachers in front of classes are constantly bombarded with sensory data at the level of perceptual, non-conceptual consciousness, while their conceptual consciousness concentrates on the lesson at hand, i.e., on the curriculum content of the day. Without this sensory data-base, there is nothing to think about when one thinks about educational phenomena. Simply having attended classes in schools and universities as a student does not suffice to give one an understanding of teaching or educating, or education, for a good many things that teachers do are not disclosed to their students, or to external observers. Why the teacher called on this or that student, for example, is the teacher's secret that may not even be fully understood by the teacher. Why the teacher asks a certain question, or responds to a question in a certain way, is also a secret. Teaching is an art that relies considerably upon the teacher's tacit understanding of specific students, children and youth in general, and so on.

In other words, philosophy of education is an interdisciplinary concern insofar as it is thinking about educational problems and phenomena that occur in state-supported, public schools in a philosophically responsible way, and one needs experience in teaching the young in these schools as well as training in philosophy to be able to think between disciplines. It is not multidisciplinary in the sense of being a synthesis of two separate disciplines. Someone with a good training in philosophy cannot become a philosopher of education simply by teaching philosophy to teachers or by supervising doctoral candidates in education within the British model, which may have occurred

within PESA, where the education of the kind received at the University of Illinois by half a dozen PESA members was severely lacking for those enrolled in doctoral programs in Australia and New Zealand.

### Library Research

This may seem like Yankee Imperialism. To the contrary, it is a critique of British Imperialism, as perhaps may be shown by reference to my background at Illinois, where I not only had to refresh my knowledge of the German and French languages as doctoral students in all fields needed to do in those days to be able to globalize their scholarship. I was therefore enabled to read works in the philosophy of education by European scholars such as Otto Friedrich Bollnow, *Existenzphilosophie und Pädagogik* (1959), Karl Dienelt, *Erziehung zur Verantwortlichkeit* (1956), Romano Guardini, *Die Lebensalter; Ihre Ethische und Pädagogische Bedeutung* (1956), Martinus Langeveld, *Einführung in die Pädagogik* (1963), and *Studien zur Anthropologie der Kindes* (1956). Werner Maihofer, *Recht und Sein; Prolegomena zu einer Rechtsontology* (1954), Konrad Mohr, *Die Pädagogik Herman Nohls* (1960), Leopold Prohaska, *Existentialismus und Pädagogik* (1955), Arnold Stenzel, *Erziehung und Leben* (1960), and Gustav Würtenberg, *Existenz und Erziehung* (1949).

These books were available in the University of Illinois Library, partly through interlibrary loan, partly because Harry Broudy, who earned his bachelors degree in German and philosophy at Boston College and read Heidegger and Kierkegaard in German at Harvard in the 1930s, had ordered them. The point is not to ask if university libraries in Australia or New Zealand have similar resources available, nor is it to ask

how many doctoral students have read these resources. It is simply to note that the University of Illinois has the third largest university library in the United States, and it is about ASEP, not PESA. These German sources were all cited in my doctoral dissertation, *The Ontological Foundation of Moral Education* (1966) and explicated in my “Phenomenology and Fundamental Educational Theory,” in *Phenomenology World Wide*, edited by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Lancaster, UK: Kluwer, 2003, pp. 589-601).

This shows a curiosity to learn how to do a kind of educational theorizing compatible with the philosophizing of Heidegger and Sartre and other existential phenomenologists. It led me to apply for the senior position advertised for a “Distinguished Scholar” at the University of Queensland. After completing the six-hundred page dissertation, I abstracted parts of it and rewrote them into seven different papers read at conferences and/or published. I rewrote them again, along with other things, into *Being and Education* (1971), where it says “Two-thirds of these chapters, but only one-third of the volume, have been previously published,” and “These papers have been completely rewritten and expanded for this volume” (pp. ix, f.). Although the book appeared five years after the dissertation, it fulfilled the old-fashioned requirement of publishing the dissertation as a book as evidence it is a legitimate contribution to knowledge and thereby earn the Ph.D.

Some twenty years later I was asked to edit *Phenomenology and Educational Discourse* in the Heinemann Philosophy of Education Series (Johannesburg, 1997). I also contributed “Phenomenology in Educational Discourse” to the series’ introductory volume, *Metatheories in Philosophy of Education*, and “Education in Existential Perspective: The Dialectic of Education for Democracy,” to its concluding volume,

*Metatheories in Educational Theory and Practice* (edited by Philip Higgs, 1993, pp. 175-196; 1998, pp. 141-165). This respect shown for my *Being and Education* a quarter of a century later in South Africa where existential phenomenology was a dominant way of thinking about education perhaps indicates why it was used as a textbook in a graduate-level course in the Dip. Ed. program at the University of Queensland when I applied for the position there twenty years earlier.

#### Thinking about Education in Queensland

On the other hand, I read a paper on teaching human rights in education at an International Network of Philosophers of Education conference in Johannesburg in August, 1996, just months before South Africa instituted its own Bill of Human Rights, and this was possible only because of the thinking about education I learned how to do in Queensland.

If my knowledge of PESA is slim, that is partly because I could not attend its conferences my first few years in Australia. In those days the universities closed down in August when the academic conferences were held. In Brisbane a study school for external students was also held that week. My appointment was in the Division of External Studies, and my students were mature, practicing teachers who began teaching with only one year of preparation due to the severe teacher shortage in the 1960s and 70s. They completed their bachelor degrees (and raised their salaries) through external studies. The subjects offered externally had the same titles and course descriptions listed in the handbook for on-campus students. Because of low enrollments in philosophy of

education externally, I devoted all my time to teaching and after three years had the highest enrollments in the Educational section of External Studies.

In the subject offered in the student's second year, I used Plato and Dewey to give them the "big picture," as did my predecessor. I wrote my own lectures according to Broudy's problem areas, but in the order found in *The Republic* and *Democracy and Education*. The lectures discussed the philosophical dimensions such as the ethical or epistemological aspects found in the texts, explicating and critiquing them to bring out their half-truths and asking students, "What do you think?" One of these printed lectures on Dewey was rewritten and published as "Education or Experience?" *Educational Theory* (1980, pp. 235-251).

I wanted students to see that Plato and Dewey were both viable and both necessary, dialectically. For example, Plato would build the school curriculum from the top down to educate the intellectual elite with the best knowledge available in society, which we still do today in the disciplines called "academic" after Plato's Academy. On the other hand, Dewey would build the curriculum from the bottom up to insure an equitable education was available to all children, which we still try to do today. Because Dewey's theory lacks adequate attention to the importance of the teacher and the relation of the teacher to the students, I added Buber and Freire to the course to update Plato's Socratic dialogical teaching.

In the first of the student's third-year courses I used Maxine Greene's *Teacher as Stranger: Educational Philosophy for the Modern Age* as the textbook for its focus on the epistemological foundation of education, with supplementary readings by Spencer, Dewey, Broudy, Hirst/Peters, et al., to disclose the various perspectives referred to by

Greene. In the second semester third-year course I used R. S. Peters' *Ethics and Education* as the textbook, partly to avoid using too many American authors, but mostly to focus upon the ethical foundations of education. I sent students ample supplementary readings on the role of freedom and equality in the classroom in the first half of the course and then on authority, democracy, and discipline and punishment in education in the second half.

In both of these third-year subjects the lectures and assignment topics concerned classroom or school problems, with varied perspectives for each problem to encourage students to think them through to their own viewpoint on a problem in the school in which they were teaching in an intellectually viable, professional manner. Because most students in the second course chose to write their assignments on discipline and punishment, I did a great deal of library research in the philosophy of law to find something besides deterrence and retribution to justify punishment without forgetting these. I found it in Giorgio Del Vecchio's explication of reparative justice and applied it to pedagogy because a friendly dialogue with a teacher can lead a child or youth to happily replace a bad deed with a good one without any use of the teacher's power. If students simply obey the teacher's use of power when used as a retributive deterrence, they do not necessarily get educated morally, and they may disobey when the teacher is not looking. At the 1987 PESA Conference I read "Reparative Justice in School Discipline," *Discourse* (1989, pp. 35-51).

This illustrates how I did my research in educational theorizing, i.e., in thinking about education in Queensland, by beginning with the problems of practicing, adult teachers and using multiple resources to have them think philosophically about some

classroom or school problem within their own experience in a quasi-Deweyan manner but hopefully concluding not with an hypothesis but with morally justifiable, professional conduct. Because the original model of external studies in Queensland was simply to have a tutor sit in on a professor's lectures and write them down, type them out, duplicate them and send them to remote students enrolled in the course, I wrote out the lectures for my students, using the textbook, supplementary readings, and my own thinking and knowledge where applicable.

I decided to rewrite at a more scholarly level the lectures for the course that used Richard Peters' book into my own book. When Peters justified liberty, equality, and fraternity as being the principles necessary to have a rational, moral discussion, however, he simply took such discussion for granted, without justifying it himself. Reasonable moral discussion, however, is necessary throughout one's growth to develop one as a moral agent and gradually become an adult human being. To become a moral agent is therefore a human right because it is necessary to become an adult human being, i.e., to become a human being. So I rewrote those lectures into *Human Rights in Education* (1983). See my "Human Dignity, Three Human Rights, and Pedagogy," *Educational Theory* (1986, pp. 33-42). The lectures for the other third-year subject were also rewritten at a more scholarly level into the book: *Education as a Human Right: A Theory of Curriculum and Pedagogy* (1990).

#### Normative, Substantive Thinking about Education

The supplementary readings sent out for assignments were often the writings of PESA members such as Brian Crittenden, Ivan Snook, Kevin Harris, Jim Walker, and

others, as well as British and American authors as suitable. Although it is tempting to stray into a complaint about the lack of attention to educational problems as such in many *Educational Philosophy and Theory* (EPAT) papers written by PESA members, it seems more important to the future of thinking about education to explain why my classes of mature, experienced teachers were given a variety of perspectives on important educational problems and allowed, even encouraged, to think them through to obtain their own perspective by comparing controversial views.

Philosophy of education, when conceived as educational theory, is about problem areas of education because educating the young is helping them develop into mature, adult human beings. As Langeveld said, the human being is the educating animal. Asking what is an adult human being, however, is a normative question about what a human being should become to be thought of as an adult. For example, drug addicts are not mature adults. It is not just a physical matter, regardless of chronological age. It is a substantive question, too, because it is about growing, developing beings who can actually enlarge themselves and their lives through learning about things and learning how to do things. Education is therefore a substantive, normative matter and its theorizing requires thinking about normative, substantive matters. Thinking about education is therefore substantive, normative thinking, i.e., a manner of philosophizing concerned with promoting through education the so-called good life and the so-called good society. As someone has said, however, science deals with problems that can be solved, whereas philosophy is concerned with unsolvable problems.

For example, Plato was concerned with an education that would develop theoretical reason, whereas Dewey wanted education to develop pragmatic intelligence.

This issue cannot be resolved by psychology or cognitive science, for it is a matter of epistemology, morality, social philosophy, genetic predispositions, and individual preferences. It is also about how the good society can be developed through education for the “good life” in the “good society,” which is a holistic matter. As Broudy recognized, the issues will remain regardless of what a specific philosopher says because philosophy necessarily deals with unsolvable problems. Briefly, philosophers are not messiahs, regardless of their opinions of their own opinions. There will always be philosophical differences. That is the nature of the animal, an essential characteristic of *homo sapiens*.

Even if one successfully outlines the essential characteristics of educational phenomena through phenomenological descriptions as I have attempted, this grounds education in the being of the young and their efforts to become someone, too, but the ontological foundation of education is neither its ethical nor its epistemic foundation, and all three dimensions are needed to establish fundamental educational theory, or, if you will, a complete philosophy of education. This is why I have written the three books mentioned, one each on the ontological, ethical, and epistemological foundations of education. Has anyone else tried to do this?

Although the fashions have been against synoptic, substantive, normative theory in philosophy of education, new methods were required to continue thinking about education as the human problem it is, and different methods of philosophizing and conducting theoretical research were used in each of my three books. Assisted by my reading of the German sources, existential phenomenology was used in the first book, then linguistic hermeneutics with some phenomenological explication occurred in the second (after Richard Peters). A deconstructive, textual hermeneutics with a dialectical

intention and some phenomenological interpretation was used in the third book (after Greene). I did not begin with a favored philosophical method but simply used whatever philosophical method of research or thinking enabled me to think about the ontological, ethical, or epistemic foundation of the educational problem at hand, one at a time. (I am not advertising the books, for they are out of print.)

### The Jungle

On the other hand, to my knowledge very few PESA members seem to have tried to ground education in the being of the child and youth, or in the human rights of the child and youth to develop moral agency and human dignity in schools, or to formulate the curriculum and pedagogy that would enable the young to become at home in the world through the disclosure of the truth of things in the world. Without moral agency and truth, however, philosophy of education is nothing. Learning something without acquiring human dignity and truth is also nothing.

The perspective of this Academic Self Portrait may justify a PESA judgment made through comments on its official journal, EPAT. In my opinion, this journal has devoted too many issues to trivial matters that were unrelated to major educational problems. Too many editors of these special issues were not adequately prepared and sometimes advocated their own narrow-minded ideologies. In some years there were too many issues of the journal, but quantity is not quality. Material considerations include the fact that authors of articles in EPAT used to be given fifty reprints at no cost, but now they have to pay \$800.00 (US) for a hundred reprints, with no alternative offered for fewer reprints. This may be the result of too many changes in publishers and editors of

EPAT. In addition to free reprints, some educational journals used to give authors a small honorarium. These changes may have resulted from the increasing domination by the Internet, or from the failure of the editor to have taught in public schools, frequently substituting “pure” philosophy for educational theorizing, and rapid publication of trendy philosophy scarcely related to educational problems as defined by the Broudy Project, with all due respect. One can also question the wisdom of having an editor who is no longer living in the geography of PESA, i.e., in Australia or New Zealand.

The point is not personal. It simply seems that the use of the British system of educating doctoral candidates as borrowed by Australian and New Zealand universities was doing it on the cheap, and, in my humble judgment, has not strengthened the philosophy of education defined as thinking about education for PESA, neither intellectually nor institutionally. To the contrary.

Perhaps the viewpoint can be expressed more generally through a personal anecdote. My first year in Queensland, the Vice-Chancellor visited the Division of External Studies one afternoon. There had been talk about disbanding the Division and returning the faculty to their parent departments. He suggested we could send him any comments about things not discussed that day. I wrote to him, received a good response, and thereby became a whistle-blower, although I did not think of it that way then. I knew why the search for my position had been for a distinguished scholar for a senior position—so he or she could make scholarly, defensible decisions. Whenever I thought that academic principles were being violated regarding an important matter, I wrote to the Vice-Chancellor or an appropriate senior committee chair. During my twenty-one years

there, I went over the head of my immediate administrator thirteen times, winning the case twelve times. The one time I lost the issue, subsequent events proved me right.

During a discussion at a department meeting in the 1990s, someone said, “Vandenberg will probably take this to the Vice-Chancellor as he always does.” On the one hand, I never told anyone that I sometimes took something to the senior part of the university to get it decided upon academic principles. On the other hand, the person who uttered the ad hominem did not ask me a question out of ordinary academic respect or because of the importance of the matter at hand. Instead, he indicated that the department was a jungle, containing predators without a conscience, who projected blame when thinking that I was the one lacking a conscience.

In general, my experience with the academic staff at the University of Queensland was that some lacked the academic acumen I had acquired elsewhere, partly through the doctoral program at Illinois and partly when Broudy tried to get our discipline to attain higher standards and rise above the oversimplified criticisms it was receiving from predators in other areas of the discipline of Education. Thus my experience with some members of PESA is that they lacked the academic acumen that might have accompanied greater academic accomplishment in philosophy of education. Part of why I had stayed in the university over forty years was to avoid the selfish, dishonest predators in society, for there is a jungle out there. Perhaps there is something of a jungle in the academic world in general in Australia and New Zealand, perhaps even in PESA. Perhaps it occurs to some extent in universities everywhere. Perhaps it is simply the way human life is. Perhaps I am simply paranoid.

If there is evidence that universities, like society, are somewhat like a jungle, however, it is all the more reason to define philosophy of education as the substantive, normative thinking of how to promote authentically human existence, human dignity, human rights, moral agency, and truth in education. Is this not the Socratic legacy?

May thinking about education in Australia and New Zealand continue to explore its ontological, ethical, and epistemic foundations. Teachers need to learn a language to understand their professional conduct within an ethical and epistemic ethos, and philosophers of education are needed to help them learn this language. This is my conclusion from working with mature, experienced teachers for two decades in Queensland. I tried to help them to become themselves as authentically human teachers by disclosing to them some of the professional teacher's possibilities in the existential, ethical, and epistemic ethos of education.

Some of the existential possibilities were disclosed in the book used in the Dip. Ed. Program in Queensland before I arrived. It dealt with specific educational phenomena such as childhood and youth as life-phases, pedagogic authority, the child's consciousness of freedom, the truth of being, non-violent power in education, the encounter, the admonition, the traditional aims of schooling: character, citizenship, and vocation. More existential possibilities were disclosed in "Openness: The Pedagogic Atmosphere," in David Ntberg, ed., *The Philosophy of Open Education* (1975, pp. 35 – 57), and in "The Transcendental Phases of Learning," (*E.P.A.T.*, 2002, pp.321 – 344). Whether the ontological, epistemological, or ethical foundation of education is the most important for thinking about education or for the professional development of teachers, however, remains an open question. Perhaps they are equiprimordial.