***Secularisation, Individuation* and *Interiorisation* and the Uncoupling of Universities from Intellectual Inquiry**

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In this paper I take a broad brush approach to describe the underlying factors of secularisation, individualisation and interiorisation to account for changes to the institution of the university. In the process I argue that warrants for what counts as knowledge have transformed with each transition and that we are entering an interiorised phase or perhaps better described as a phase of “individualised authenticity” for what counts as legitimate knowledge. The consequences are as yet indeterminate, but I venture that the view that universities will take divergent paths, either following the market of “learning needs” and “economically relevant research”, largely abandoning the traditional role of critical analysis to manifest a new and more communicative form of analysis and critique which will see the evolution of new processes of teaching and research.

In 2001 Zygmunt Bauman wrote of universities that many would not survive long into the 21st century, or at least not survive in currently recognisable form, due to complex social change driven not just by new technology but by what he has called the “Individualized” society. (Bauman, 2001) This has not happened apace yet but universities have changed and there are signs of decline such as the fact that enrolments have peaked in developing countries and the value of a university education is being questioned.

The current situation is mixed of course; there are many exceptions such as the “Ivy League” universities in the United States and some schools and faculties in Australia and Britain, particularly Scotland. Europe is also a mixed picture. No transformation, so large and complex can ever be a matter of simple uniformity. However, we see enrolment numbers in both relative and absolute terms in the liberal arts and human sciences continuing to fall and disciplines such as classics, historical studies and philosophy disappearing altogether from many institutions. The pure sciences, particularly physics and mathematics are faring no better. The growth continues to be in the professions, law, medicine and health sciences and commerce; the “basic disciplines” are often only maintained to service these courses. Research funds from government continue to fall and are increasingly directed into medical and technological sciences. One colleague took me slightly aback a couple of years ago when in anger he said, “this place is becoming just a glorified TAFE”. No negative reflection on TAFE implied, I know he had the greatest respect for experiential learning, but we do get the message that the scholarly dimension is on the descendent.

The discipline of education and the education of teachers continue to struggle. Research funds in the field are scarce, the quality of students, taken as a cohort, questionable, and the discipline seemingly always on the defensive against challenges from inside and outside the university.

The working conditions, job security and rewards of academic staff at Australian universities, particularly those involved in teaching continue in steep decline. The academic life has become one of stress and overwork for continuing staff and stress, underwork and poor remuneration for short contract and sessional staff who now do the bulk of teaching in undergraduate courses at Australian universities, recently estimated to be around 70% of the taught hours. Students suffer and the student experienced is diminished; teaching hours have been reduced, class sizes increased (tutorial size at La Trobe is 40 -that in my view is a lecture any reasonable tutorial learning objectives cannot be delivered) and more content put exclusively on-line.

Universities are no longer anything resembling “communities of scholars” or “centres of intellectual excellence and creativity” that they once aspired to. They don’t even seriously pretend any longer to aspire to those values. Certainly there is some tokenistic language, but their management practises and corporate structures belie this. Their eyes are firmly fixed on the international rankings, popularity polls in essence, which is where they seek to feature as a “marketing tool”. They are businesses, big businesses, selling higher education for a profit (or “return on investment” as it is decorously described) and conducting research with a primarily commercial focus. It is commonplace amongst critics of the changes in universities to point to the ascendency of neo-liberal ideology and the triumph of pragmatism and expediency over principle. I am sympathetic to these analyses, but can only observe that universities are in large part a reflection of the broader societal values, and in my view this is perhaps is as it should be. I accept that universities have changed and nostalgia for better past is not going to bring back those times or those values.

This is all familiar territory to those here, most of whom will need little persuasion. My focus though is why has this happened and what now for those who value universities as sites of significant intellectual endeavours? I then sketch out a possible and partially optimistic future.

The full response to these questions would run for many volumes, so here I can only indicate what I discern to be the major themes.

What has happened and why has it happened?

In the context of changing universities commentators often discuss factors such as those indicated earlier, the rise of neo-liberalism, globalisation and the information revolution. Yes, these are factors but they only happen because underlying values and understandings give them support and a clear path.

Those underlying factors that I identify are *Secularisation, individualisation* and *interiorisation* and my discussion will concentrate on these as progressively effecting social change that in turn both directly and indirectly brings about fundamental changes in universities. And it is not all bad, but it is ferociously complicated and not a little conflicted.

The discussion that follows owes a great deal to the work of Charles Taylor, and in particular to *A Secular Age* and *The Ethics of Authenticity.*

1. *Secular*, as considered by Charles Taylor (2007, pp. 54-56) is commonly contrasted with the spiritual, but, as Taylor explains, its’ meaning is rooted in the notion of time. “Secular” time is contrasted with “higher” time. Secular time is the common everyday understanding of the hours and days that flow in a regular sequence; the mundane. The higher time marks “higher days” such as feast days or exulted moments and is connected to ecstatic experience but more significantly connects human experience to an “enchanted”, as Max Weber called it, cosmos or the Greater Chain of Being. Taylor comments that in this sense Christmas day 2015 is more closely connected, especially in the Christian experience of the day, with the day of Christ’s birth 2015 years ago than Boxing Day which immediately follows, although that too can be a “high day” for cricket fans.

The decline of the spiritual or “enchanted” world has been long but continuous to the point where nearly all Western societies and other advanced societies such as Japan can be said to be overwhelmingly secular. The path and causes of this are magnificently charted by Taylor in his towering scholarly work *A Secular Age* (2007). The rise of science has something to do with it but it is far from the whole story. It is certainly not within the current scope of the paper to even summarise Taylor’s account; but the rise of the age of reason and autonomy is central.

What I want to point to here is that in the pre-secular, enchanted world, characterised by ubiquitous religious belief and belief in God; everyday actions, observances, institutions and authority structures were connected via the Great Chain of Being to the Creator. Political authority, via the divine right of kings, came from God, not from human beings. Thus the hierarchical order of society in which each had his place and, to a lesser degree her place, from nobleman to serf was ordained by God. If this sounds strange to our ears it was ingrained in the commonplace understanding of late medieval and renaissance times. To challenge the political order anywhere in Europe in say 1400 could be construed as a challenge to divine authority akin to an act of blasphemy. One illustration of this can be seen in the extreme punishments handed out to heretics or dissenters of the day, like the hapless Tyndale, such as hanging, drawing and quartering or Tyndale’s punishment, burning at the stake, which were intended more to drive out the evil embodied in the offender, than to cause the extreme pain that they no doubt did. The point was that the divinely ordained order had to be “rebalanced” as it were. Although one must say that it beggars belief today that at the time merely possessing a copy the holy scripture in English was a capital offence.

But, getting back to the topic, my point of relevance here is the medieval and pre-modern universities were an institution that was part of this divinely ordained order, they often evolved from ecclesiastical institutions, usually monastic schools and were usually given the royal imprimatur with the establishment of colleges and royal patronage. A practise which continues, at least in token form in many places today. The position of universities in that hierarchical and divinely ordered society was somewhat ambivalent, between state and church as it were with increasing authority of its own. An interesting historical study could be made of this and its’ legacy, but again there is not the space to pursue it here. Rather, the point I want to make is that the divinely ordered society ensured the place and authority of the university in society. And it was a high place, only half a step below the church and with a direct line to the monarch.

In this context the station of a person in life was determined by the natural order, this was internalised and went largely unquestioned. That was simply the fact of the hierarchical order being an expression of God’s well ordered creation. To question one’s place was to question the divine order and God’s wisdom. To become a dissenter, or in the extreme case a revolutionary, was not just to agitate for political change but to seek to disrupt the natural order of things and thus a form of heresy and was punished accordingly. Universities were one of the two institutions by means of which an individual could legitimately rise above their station; the other being the church. To rise in social rank via an institution that was sanctioned within the natural social order was okay, and stood in contrast to the “upstart”. Although of course, instances of such transition were not that common and universities remained preordinately an institution for the further education of privileged and aristocratic males.

My point, of course, is now becoming clear; the university was authorised as an institution by the divine/natural order and found an esteemed place therein by right. The knowledge developed and transmitted by the pre-modern university came pre-legitimated as it were, with divine authority. The disciplines of thought and practise – liberal arts, philosophy, theology, law and physic(medicine) and their content were connected to a divine order beyond the everyday and connected directly to things at once higher and deeper and in the true sense of the word mysterious. They were intrinsically *unscientific,* as what valorised knowledge was not evidence but authority. A seminal illustration of the clash of the modern and pre-modern cultures appears in the trial of Galileo who (to oversimplify matters) argued that he could not doubt his own eyes and mathematical calculations in relation to the position of the planets and the Earth, and that God would not deceive him. Only to be countered with the assertion from the Church that God would not as matter of principle create man(sic) in His own image and likeness in a place other than the centre of the universe and that the authority of scripture was beyond question. As we know Galileo lost and was found guilty of heresy by the Inquisition and sentenced to house arrest and forbidden to teach or publicise his views for the rest of life, which as a faithful believer caused him great distress.

Of course I must add the professors of the disciplines of the day were accorded near aristocratic or “god like” status in this universe, an attribution that sadly no longer persists.

2. *Individualisation*. The modern university (approx. 1800 – present) as we would recognise it is not so old. It was founded during the peak of the enlightenment and the early industrial revolution and the major figure in its’ establishment is Wilhelm von Humboldt 1767- 1835, brother of the more famous explorer and naturalist, Alexander von Humboldt, and friend of Goethe; he was also, arguably, the originator of the modern concept of political liberty. Wilhelm von Humboldt was responsible for the reorganisation of the wider Prussian education system and the foundation of the University of Berlin in 1810, which now bears his name. He emphasised that the strength of the Prussian federation would depend on the skills and learning of the middle classes and established policies to provide for broader entry based on merit into schools and universities, which he claimed would one day even admit women! At this stage the scope of disciplines was expanded to include more scientific and technological study such as engineering, biological sciences and chemistry. The inclusion of the study of economics and the human sciences would progressively follow during the 19th Century. Also, as part of this reform, came the articulation of the research function of the university, in addition to its scholarship and teaching functions. It was now okay to discover new knowledge, not just to reveal deeper layers or hidden truths of established knowledge.

The Humboldtian reform vision was enthusiastically adopted by the burgeoning new universities in the United States of America and contributed to the rapid technological and economic development there, but were adopted much more slowly in Britain and its colonies such as Australia and New Zealand, where universities stuck by an elitist model right up to the mid twentieth century.

The basis of the knowledge foundation of the new universities was reason and the scientific method. These changes, slow inevitable and contested down to the present day, have been very thoroughly explored by many writers from Koestler to Taylor. The aspect that is core to this paper is the breakdown in the idea that the core of disciplinary authority resided in the God-given cosmic order and came to depend on reasoned evidence. Thus the position of the university in society underwent a great positional change.

The levels of analysis become complex and vexing at this point because most universities layered the Humboldtian reform over the traditional model, as it were, claiming one type knowledge legitimation for some traditional disciplines and another for the modern disciplines. This is not altogether inappropriate and is still the case to a minor degree as it is necessary for the claim to legitimization of the university as “place apart” from the socio-political mainstream.

Nevertheless, the authority of knowledge in the modern university overwhelmingly derives from its coherence and verifiability. The gold standards as it were, of the scientific modernism.

But the other elements of modernism are of even greater importance to the development of the modern university, these are democracy and the notion of individual liberty. The lineage of ideas here can be traced back to Hobbes’ insight of genius, that the authority of a sovereign, whether an individual or a group such as parliament is derived from those over whom the sovereign rules; and not from God and not embedded in a divine ordering of nature and the cosmos. This insight was amplified over the next century by many, notably John Locke, J. J. Rousseau and David Hume. The concept of autonomy grew throughout the 19th century with concepts of full autonomy and self-responsibility clearly articulated in very different ways by John Stuart Mill and Arthur Schopenhauer. Prior to these writings the notion of free will, derived from St Augustine, amounted in large part to freedom to accept or reject the will of God. After Mill it amounted to an absolute freedom to choose any available course of action and bear the consequences and after Schopenhauer the freedom to shape the moral and psychological manifold as one judged to be right. And yes if Gott was not exactly “tot” as so famously pronounced by Nietzsche, He was certainly superfluous to worldly requirements. The authority to govern resided in the nation state most familiar to us today and the university became a organ of the state rather than the church or the crown.

For the university the main point was that the standard of truth was now evidential, supported by inductive, and not merely deductive, reasoning and that the knower was a self-determining individual possessed of liberty and the capacity to process and synthesise the content of knowledge. Overlay this with the democratic movements of both the left and right and one gets to the modern understanding of the university as primarily a secular institution, in the broadest sense, whose main purpose is to serve the interests of the individual, sectional societal interests and/or the state. Universities became aligned with the nation state and were understood to serve the interests of the state, most often by coincidently serving the interests of the individual citizens of the state. We see this reflected in the discussions today around university funding where the extent of government funding seeks to match only the public benefit afforded by the “value added” to society by graduates and research outcomes. The balance, it is argued, should be funded by individuals who stand to receive higher incomes or enterprises that stand to benefit by more productive workers or by commercialised research outcomes.

This is the environment in which the very familiar processes of analysis and critique evolved which we associate closely with research; essentially using the processes of public contestability to establish the truth or otherwise of a proposition. Peer review, experimental methods and the use of critical fora, such as this, are common manifestations. In the earlier era of pre-modern university scholarship and “learnedness” were more important paths to knowledge formation and legitimation. Depth of knowledge and erudition were important when the valorisation of knowledge depended on authority. As an illustration we see Aquinas simply refer to “the philosopher”, by whom he of course meant Aristotle, as a warrant for the validity of a proposition or intellectual conviction. Erasmus frequently used the authority of scripture, in conjunction with reason, to justify his claims about the humanist path.

In teaching and learning in the modern university we see the public lecture, tutorial and examination as the most common modes of knowledge transfer. What is important here is to see these as manifestations of the valorisation of certain forms of knowledge and modalities of learning. These contrast with the earlier era, which valued depth of learning, erudition and purity of understanding. The concomitant teaching methods were rather different, relying on immersion in classical texts and personal mentorship. It is no coincidence that the archaic term of “reading” a discipline persists in some few traditional universities.

The *modern* the model of the university with which, I dare to say, most of us are comfortable and familiar and it is the passing of this model which most of us regret.

3. *Interiorisation*: the post-modern university.

I struggle here with a meaningful term and use “post-modern” really to denote the university post the modern university. The three stages of warrants for the authority of knowledge I designate as “pre-modern”, “modern”, “post-modern”. Also, the claims and observations here will be contested, and are certainly to a degree tentative and conflicted as I seek to describe an emerging phenomenon whose outcome is not by any means clear or certain. However, I do claim that the intellectual and ideational forces driving the change are inexorable. I also again maintain that a complicating factor is that in the evolution of the university one layer of development is placed over the former so all three value and knowledge structures, in a way, persist together.

The university, as we are all too well aware, is changing, it always has, but the process of change here is transformational; it commenced about 1980 and is still in process and will be in process for at least many decades to come. Very many commentators have made contributions here of which Barnett, Delanty, Gibbons, and many others in long list, have been prominent. The “changing university” commentariat has become an industry in itself. Its’ contributors, including myself, typically point to factors like the massification of higher education, the technological revolution, globalisation or the “knowledge explosion” as causes of this change. It is also apposite to describe this change as a “disruptive” change as the very assumptions which have given legitimacy to the modern university are in the terms of a paradigm shift simply falling away.

I think these analyses, whilst insightful, miss the most important influencing factors and I am going to take a different tack as I outline those factors. I see the above as consequences, or at least symptoms, of rather less obvious but deeper causes. These causes lie in the changes to the way we see persons, society and culture. They also of course reflect the deeper changes in values and ontological commitments. This characteristic of change was presciently summed up by Taylor,

[Modern] culture has seen a many faceted movement that one could call “subjectivation”: that is, things centre more and more on the subject, and in a host of ways. Things that were once settled by some external reality – traditional law, say, or nature – are now referred to our choice. Issues where we were meant to accept the dictates of authority we now have to think out for ourselves. Modern freedom and autonomy centres us on ourselves, and the ideal of authenticity requires that we discover and articulate our own identity. (Taylor, C. 1991, p. 81)

This statement characterises a central feature of post-modernity and relates closely to Bauman’s many characterisations of “individualization” that pervade all current developed societies. It is also reflected in Taylors more extensive recent discussions of “interiority” and what he calls the “buffered self”. (Taylor 2007 pp.134-142)

A further feature of post-modernity is a new conception of time, one that leaves the linear secularity of modernism behind. Time becomes episodic, relative and even fragmentary. One “event horizon” does not have to connect up to another. In some ways this is the Heideggerian account taken to its “logical” conclusion. (See Heidegger 1962 Section 69) It is as it were that an individual can be in office time, home time and leisure time which are each non-commensurate with the other, to say nothing of so called reflection, critique and intellectual creativity “quality time”.

I would claim a pivotal moment in the shift to the “individualized authenticity” I describe came to the surface with the much derided “counter-culture” and anti-war movements of the 1960’s and 1970’s, largely driven by disillusion with the nationalism that fuelled WWII and the cold war and by the misappropriation of genuine liberty by the rise of corporate capitalism. There were imbedded in these movements the assumptions that the nation state had fallen short, if not altogether failed, and that the project of liberty was too constrained to deliver genuine “liberation”; characterised by the lyrics, “Freedom’s just another word for nothing left to lose”, in the popular Janis Joplin song of the day. There was a sense that the enlightenment project had failed and that its institutions including the university had also failed. There remain ongoing live struggles from that era between the socially progressive and reactionary forces and will, I predict, have some future disruptive iterations.

In the consequent context higher education has, for the first time, come to be seen as a universal right, rather than an entitlement of class or privilege of merit. But in this change the place of the university as “place apart” and as such a place for scholarship and informed reflection and critique, has been obscured. Somewhere in this process the university has become an institution that exists primarily to serve a functional purpose in society and the needs of the individual. Rather than a place to preserve and deepen knowledge, as in the pre-modern university, or to discover and transmit new knowledge as in the modern university, the post-modern university has become a place to serve the “knowledge needs” of the individual. The warrant for knowledge has become its utilitarian value to the individual, and to institutions and/or enterprises. To follow the theme of the paper the warrant for knowledge becomes the salience of the knowledge for the individual; how useful it is in achieving their life satisfactions. I am not claiming that this is necessarily a bad thing, it is surely a good that larger numbers of people are able to get a higher education, and that courses are more responsive to individual needs and differences, but rather that such an institution is a departure from what has broadly been understood as a “university”. Certainly the orthodox structure of the university formed around a canon of knowledge and ordered disciplines won’t be appropriate to respond to the fluid world of changing learning needs. Many universities are already adapting to a changed world by becoming more interdisciplinary and offering courses in a more flexible formats. They have nearly all become more commercial and market oriented. This is a world in which the familiar features such as tenure of staff and enduring faculty structures become constraints on the flexible response to individual needs rather than the traditional advantages of stability and substance.

Yet there is another side to individualised authenticity that universities have been slow to recognise and respond to, although many have done so. That is the wish for more immanent forms of knowledge than hitherto recognised. By this I mean areas such as gender studies, personal resilience training, patient centred health care, personal forms of spirituality such as eco-spirituality and similar.

In what follows I want to sketch out two divergent paths for universities reflecting what at first appear incongruent, the market and the self, but with a common set of generating factors. One path sees universities as market driven organisations satisfying demand, expressed as satisfying the learning needs of individuals and the research demands of industry. In this mode what has been seen as traditional scholarly activity comes to be seen as an indulgence or luxury that cannot be afforded. Here there is an uncoupling between the institution of the university and its traditional function of being a site of reflection, critique and intellectual creativity. The other more immanent path sees universities developing new and more formidable frameworks of analysis, critique and intellectual creativity. The two are clearly largely incompatible and will see a bifurcation of the university sector.

The source of these divergent paths is identified by Taylor, although perhaps not fully articulated. (1991 p. 82). His account goes some way to explain the deeper issues behind the apparent inconsistency between universities following a neo-liberal market driven agenda and at the same time attempting to cater individualised authenticity. Taylor characterises this as a confusing or conflating of the difference between the manner and the content of personal satisfaction as an aim of life. On the one hand is the self-centredness of consumer satisfactions, so easily manipulated by the market which not only creates needs out of wants but is so good at creating wants we did not even suspect imaginable. On the other hand is the search for meaning and profundity in an aura of deep inwardness. It is as if by ever going deeper into ourselves we can discover even more profound and mysterious hidden truths. This contrasts strongly with the pre-modern period in which wants and needs were framed by a set of moral precepts and mystery was to be found in religious belief, the sublime of nature and more generally in an “enchanted” sphere beyond the mundane. Meditation could lead to ecstasy but this was as a result of connection with a profound external source of inspiration, not the depth within the individual’s psyche. In the modern world it was pursuit of the sense of the sublime in great art or nature. There could be an explanation here of the rise of the drug culture as psychoactive drugs give a sense of depth and the ecstatic to otherwise prosaic inner experience.

What I maintain here is that some few of the established universities, will transform and regenerate to cater for the “new critique”, but most current universities will become more narrowly responsive to the demands of the market with its utilitarian, “outcomes focussed” rationales, progressively become “dumbed down” and increasingly corporatized, some that fail to make the grade will be taken over or closed. But more optimistically beside those established universities that follow the market some will transform and there will arise a raft of new “boutique” institutions, most not seeking to call themselves universities -and this is already happening. Also, there will be hybrids of the above, colleges, research institutes etc., diversity is built into the generative rationale for this change.

How did these divergent directions come about?

The common thread lies in the “subjective turn” which has found expression in so many pathways, in phenomenology, in the post-Hegelian theorists, in psychoanalysis, in neo-liberal economics, relativity theory in physics, in the therapeutic approach to health and post-Durkheimian sociology. A very long list that could be amplified and nuanced times over, but the grounding principle is that the authenticity of being is to be found in subjective human experience. To trace the genealogy of ideas that have led to this is like trying to trace the source of a major river, one could go back to Luther and his insistence on the primacy of individual conscience and understanding of scripture, certainly to Hobbes and to the early empiricists, although they had objective claims as well, it was Berkley who drew things to the subjective point. Kant is however no doubt a major theorist in this narrative through the “transcendental aesthetic” internalising the intuitions by which experience is manifested and judgements made. I could, and no doubt am obliged to elaborate in much more detail here to establish my claims, but as that would be a major undertaking away from the focus of the paper I will have to put it to one side for now.

What I am claiming is that the warrant for knowledge in the post-modern university is the authenticity of individual experience and this has deep roots in the contemporary way of being.

One can see signs of universities moving to accommodate this, largely unconsciously, through claims to “deliver” individualised and personalised learning; concepts that would have been incomprehensible prior to the 1980’s. By this I mean that knowledge was taken to be universal and objective; the idea that one “understanding” could be as valid as another, depending on the situation and subjective condition of the knower would not have been entertained; even less would it have been thought that universities should accommodate this. In research we see the rise of qualitative methods; so called phenomenology and narrative methods becoming commonplace in education and other human sciences research. This has enriched the teaching and research function of universities but along side it is the rise of demand driven learning and research. At its crudest form it amounts to “teach me what I need to get the best paying job”, and in research “deliver new knowledge that will provide a commercial return”. These are valid positions and perfectly legitimate in the current political economy but they do not reflect the traditional values of disciplinary learning or discovery focussed research. It is at this point that I maintain there is an uncoupling between universities and the functions of reflection, critique and intellectual creativity.

*A note on technology*. As I indicated above I view technology more as a symptom or consequence of deeper changes rather than a driver of change. I need to explain. The interiorisation of knowledge claims has given epistemological and moral legitimacy to technology mediated communication and information transfer.

In the pre-modern world the concept of progress and the discovery of new knowledge was not entertained at all. The source of knowledge was the scholarly authority of the professor. Knowledge was something to be *revealed* and so there was no warrant for progressive discoveries. In this world there was no moral rational for what we would call social or technological progress and those who sought it would be, and were, roundly condemned as heretics, perhaps the only exception was to found in the science of armaments and even there progress was slow, constrained by notions of “legitimate” weapons of battle. The universities of the day were similarly constrained in their curriculum and content, there was literally more chance of studying alchemy or astrology than chemistry or astronomy as we know them.

The modern era of course legitimised the idea of progress and science and technology as human goods by recognising the empirical basis for knowledge and the idea that new knowledge could be discovered. The science-based technological progress of the era has been a vast positive contributor to human well-being, but not without serious qualification and at a cost to the environment with which we are now just coming to a reckoning. Here technology became a legitimate product of discovery and to a limited extent a means of discovery via instruments such as the microscope. But technology itself was not constitutive of knowledge. This is familiar territory and does not need further elaboration in this context.

Now we are mid the technological revolution in communications and information technology (ICT). It has become so ubiquitous that when we use the word technology we have to remind ourselves that the steam engine was an equally significant and transforming technological advance in its day. My claim is that the interiorisation of warrants for knowledge has legitimised ICT technology as a means of human communication and a source of knowledge, in the sense that it becomes part of what Kant would have called the “manifold” or Husserl the “world” in his quasi technical use of the term. The iPhone, lap top etc. on this account are the physical manifestations of phenomenology, perhaps to draw a rough analogy in the way in which a nuclear reactor is a physical manifestation of relativity theory. This to say that the image we see on a screen is acceptable to us because we accept it as a “real” field of intentionality and understand the levels of intentionality of process that lie behind its production. The contention here is that the interiorisation of the concepts of knowledge and indeed, of being, lead to an opening of acceptance that reality is the experience within. The essence of this shift in conception of the core of conscious being as the subject of knowledge can be found in Husserl, expressed perhaps most clearly in *Ideas,* where it is the intentional experience that brings to reality the world of experience; of things, objects and values.

As an illustration I can share a common experience. I was recently waiting for my country train at Southern Cross Station in Melbourne, it was late, no surprise there. There were probably five hundred people standing on the long platform waiting for the delayed Eaglehawk train, few were speaking but a clear majority were fixed upon the screens of smart phones and very many also had ear buds in. If one took the sample down to the under forty year olds it was near universal. These people were comfortably retreating to their interiorised consciousness comfort zones, into their electronically buffered selves. I am not making value judgements here, many were no doubt involved in rich personalised experiences, but I am making an observation about the “individualized authenticity” of the contemporary self. Would Husserl have been surprised? Probably, but in fact the phenomenon is a consequence to the intentionality of consciousness in the pure phenomenology.

Under this frame we can see ICT as an extension of reach of both pure and transcendental phenomenology; pure phenomenology in that it extends the reach of intentional experience and transcendental phenomenology in that it vastly extends the horizons for enframing of intentional experience.

Now to draw a few threads together. I am arguing that we are in the midst of a transformation of the university as we know it as an institution. That there will be two directions to that transformation driven by differing responses to the interiorisation of warrants for knowledge; on one hand many and maybe most universities will follow the market model and seek to meet the needs (the learning needs and research needs) of their customers (formerly students and the community). There will be winners and losers in this quest but whatever transpires the modernist model of analysis, critique and reflection will be lost as the contribution to the community and broad personal well-being will be diminished as either unfunded or not profitable. The result will be an uncoupling between the institution of the university and the traditional critical functions. This is not a matter of good or bad intentions or weasel words in mission statements it is built into the existential rationale of the institutions.

On the other hand the interiorisation of warrants for knowledge will lead to a (disruptive) change to the idea of a university. The outcomes are not clear yet but much can be indicated. The “new university” will be largely independent of government, perhaps community based, but it will develop new forms of critique, built on older models because the essence lies in human communication, but the focus will be on new conceptions human well-being beyond material well-being. The institution is likely to be more specialised focussing on say humanities, alternatively physical sciences, biological sciences, etc. Perhaps A. C. Grayling’s New Academy of the Humanities is model for the future, or maybe it will be CERN, but it is early days. Whatever develops the new model will have to accommodate individualized authenticity as a warrant for knowledge.

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